The Fictitious Payee and Payroll Padding: Royal Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd. by Geva, Benjamin
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
1978
The Fictitious Payee and Payroll Padding: Royal
Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps
(1961) Ltd.
Benjamin Geva
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, bgeva@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Geva, Benjamin. "The Fictitious Payee and Payroll Padding: Royal Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd."
Canadian Business Law Journal 2.3 (1978): 418-436.
COMMENTARY
THE FICTITIOUS PAYEE AND PAYROLL PADDING: ROYAL BANK
OF CANADA v. CONCRETE COLUMN CLAMPS (1961) LTD.
I
In Royal Bank of Canada v. Concrete Column Clamps (1961) Ltd
(hereafter Royal Bank),' the Supreme Court of Canada was faced
with an issue, characterized as "a new one for this Court but an
old one in the law of negotiable instruments."2
A payroll clerk, whose normal duty is to prepare wage or salary cheques for
employees of a company, perpetrates a fraud by including among the che-
ques presented to the authorized signing officer of the company a number of
cheques payable to persons who were not owed any wages, some being for-
mer employees and the other such payees having names which may or may
not be those of existing persons. The fraudulent clerk abstracts these che-
ques, forges the endorsements and obtains payment from the company's
bank which debits the company's account accordingly. Who, as between the
company and the bank should bear the loss?
3
The general rule with respect to a forged or an unauthorized sig-
nature on a bill 4 is contained in s. 49(1) of the Bills of Exchange
Act (the "Act"). 5 Such a signature is "wholly inoperative, and no
right to retain the bill or to give a discharge therefor or to enforce
payment thereof against any party thereto can be acquired
through or under that signature". 6 The effect of this section7 is to
'(1976), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 26.
2 Ibid., at p. 27, per Laskin, C.J.C. Earlier decisions of lower courts in Canada (alongside
with cases from England and the U.S.) are cited and analyzed by Laskin. C.J.C., at pp. 33
et seq. An early Canadian case is London Life Ins. Co. v. Molsons Bank (1904). 8 O.L.R.
238. The most recent is Banque Royale du Canada t'. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. et
Mnard, [ 19741, Que. C.A. 462.
3 Royal Bank, supra, footnote I at p. 27, per Laskin. C.J.C. A more detailed account of the
facts appears in the decision of Spence. J., at pp. 44-5. See also the account of Pigeon, J.,
at p. 47.
4 A cheque is a type of a bill. and "the provisions of this Act applicable to a bill of exchange
payable on demand apply to a cheque": s. 165 of the Act (cited and defined in footnote 5
and text, infra).
5 R.S.C. 1970. c. B-5. Section 49(l) of the Act is a parallel ofs. 24 of the English Bills of Ex-
change Act, 1882 (U.K.), c. 61 (hereafter referred to as the English Act).
6 Under s. 49(l) itself, this rule is subject to an exception where "the party against whom it
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force a bank that has paid a cheque and debited the account of
the drawee, based on a forged or unauthorized endorsement, to re-
credit the account and to bear the loss.8
An exception to this general rule lies in the fictitious payee sec-
tion. Thus, under s. 21(5) of the Act, 9 "[w]here the payee is a ficti-
tious or non-existing person, the bill may be treated as payable to
bearer" (hereafter referred to as the rule of the fictitious payee). In
debiting the account of its customer with the sum of a cheque paid
to the order of a fictitious payee, the bank is protected under this
section and the loss is thrown upon the drawer.' 0
The issue for the court in Royal Bank was whether the case fell
within the general rule under s. 49(1) of the Act, or within the ex-
ception thereto under s. 21(5). More specifically, the general rule
under s. 49(1) being quite clear, the precise issue was the applica-
bility of s. 21(5) of the Act to the facts of the case."
With regard to named payees who were not former employees,
it was held by the trial judge12 and the Quebec Court of Appeal 3
that as they were non-existing 14 they fell within s. 21(5) of the Act.
No issue with respect to these cheques was raised in the Supreme
Court.' 5 At the same time, with regard to named payees who were
former employees, it was held, by the trial judge, 16 the Quebec
Court of Appeal' and the majority of the Supreme Court, 8 that
is sought to retain or enforce payment of the bill is precluded from setting up the forgery
or want of authority." For the possible applicability of this exception to the facts of Royal
Bank, see footnotes 108-111 and text, infra.
7 In England (unlike in Canada) the parallel section (s. 24 of the English Act) does not ap-
ply to payment of a drawee bank on a forged endorsement. See section Il1, infra, and s. 60
of the English Act.
8 Provided the drawer will give "notice in writing of such forgery to the drawee within one
year after he has acquired notice of such forgery": s. 49(3) of the Act. This requirement
was met by the drawer in Royal Bank (supra, footnote I, at p. 47), of course. the bank (or
the customer if he fails in his claim under s. 49 of the Act) has a cause of action against
the wrongdoer.
9 Section 7(3) of the English Act.
i0 In general, see Falconbridge On Banking and Bills of Exchange, 7th ed., Rogers, ed., (To-
ronto, Canada Law Book Ltd., 1969), pp. 477, 480-7.
1 Cf sections 11, IV, infra; the superimposition of negligence concepts on s. 49(l) of the
Act in general.
12 Cited in Royal Bank, supra, footnote 1, at p. 28, per Laskin, C.J.C.
13 [1974] Que. C.A. 213 sub nomn. Royal Bank of Canada v. Fix Fast Ltd.; see Royal Bank,
supra, footnote 1, at p. 28.
14 But see footnotes 24-5 and text, infra.
15 Royal Bank, supra, footnote I at p. 28.
16 Supra, footnote 12.
17 Supra, footnote 13.
18 The majority opinion was delivered by Pigeon, J. (Royal Bank, supra, footnote I at p. 46),
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these payees could not be described as "fictitious or non-existing"
within the meaning of s. 21(5) of the Act. Consequently, the
drawee bank could not debit the account of the company for the
value of these cheques.
In holding the bank liable for the cheques drawn to the order of
named former employees, though not for the other cheques, the
majority of the Supreme Court purported to apply the established
rule in the English law under which the intention of the drawer (or
more specifically the one who actually signs the bill as the drawer)
determines whether the payee is fictitious, but not whether he is
non-existing. Only in the latter situation is the objective fact of the
existence or non-existence, rather than the intention of the drawer,
decisive.' 9 Thus, according to the majority of the Royal Bank
court, the officer who drew the cheques, being misled by the dis-
honest clerk, did not intend those cheques to be payable to the or-
der of fictitious or non-existing persons. Therefore, only cheques
drawn to the order of non-existing persons, i.e., to the order of
those who were not former employees, fell within the statutory ex-
ception of s. 21(5) of the Act. Cheques drawn to the order of
named former employees remained covered by the general rule of
s. 49(1) of the Act, and the drawee bank could not debit the ac-
count of the drawer with the sums thereof.
Undoubtedly, in reading the words "to the knowledge of the
drawer" after "fictitious" but not after "non-existing" in s. 21(5) of
the Act, 20 the majority of the Royal Bank court followed the unan-
imous opinion of all major textbook writers2' and restated the rule
that emerges from the leading cases. 22 However, whatever the di-
fference between "fictitious" and "non-existing", 23 the distinction
with whom Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Beetz and de Grandpr6 JJ., concurred. Dissenting
opinions were given by Laskin, C.J.C. (at p. 27), with whom Dickson, J., concurred and
Spence, J. (at p. 43).
19 For this summary, see e.g., Byles On Bills of Exchange, 23rd ed., Megrah and Ryder, eds.
(1972), p. 26.
20 Cf Royal Bank, supra, footnote I at p. 47, per Pigeon, J.
21 In addition to those referred to in footnotes 10 and 19, supra, see e.g., Chalmers On Bills
of Exchange, 20th ed., Smout, ed. (1964), pp. 24-7; Riley, Bills of Exchange, 2nd ed.
(1964), p. 52; cf Cowen On the Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa, 4th ed.,
Cowen and Gering eds. (1966), pp. 6 6 -7 2 .
22 See e.g., Vinden v. Hughes, [1905] 1 K.B. 795; North & South Wales Bank, Ltd v. Macbeth,
[1908] A.C. 137. The rule was followed in recent Canadian cases cited in Royal Bank,
supra, footnote 1, at p. 47, per Pigeon, J.
23 The term "non-existing" was originally regarded by Chalmers as "no doubt
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between former employees and others, in the circumstances of this
case, seems quite unintelligible. Where, as here, the selection of
the names of the payees by the dishonest clerk was casual and not
an essential component in the fraudulent scheme, 24 a person
whose name is taken from a telephone directory is no more "non-
existing" or less "fictitious" than a person whose name is taken
out of a list of former employees. 25 In either case, it is impossible
to conceive of any specific intention on the part of the signing
officer who mechanically signs a large number of cheques payable
to names he does not know at all.
26
For these reasons, a powerful dissent was delivered by Chief
Justice Laskin. He concluded that in the facts of the case the
named former employees were "fictitious" persons under s. 21(5)
of the Act and that the intention of the dishonest clerk should be
attributed to the drawer-company. 27 Thus, while only slightly
modifying the accepted interpretation of s. 21(5) of the Act,28 Las-
kin C.J.C., found for the drawee bank.
While supporting the position of the Chief Justice,29 Mr. Justice
Spence also added in his dissent that the bank was faultless3 ° and
that "it would have been quite easy in proper office management
to have designed sufficient methods of checking and verifying to
have defeated ... [the dishonest clerk's] scheme." 3'
superfluous"; Chalmers, "Vagliano's Case", 7 L.Q.R. 216 (1891), at p. 219 (hereafter
cited as: Chalmers Vagliano); See also Vagliano Brothers v. The Bank of England (1889),
23 Q.B.D. 243 at p. 260,per Bowen, LJ. None the less, later cases distinguished between
"fictitious" and "non-existing" by saying that while "[existence or non-existence of a
particular person is a question of fact, not relevant to anybody's mind or intention ... . A
thing can only be fictitious relatively to some one." North & South Wales Bank, Ltd. v.
Macbeth, [1908] 1 K.B. 13 at p. 22, per Lord Buckley. See footnotes 19-20 and text, supra.
24 The objective fact of who were former employees and who were not, was discovered only
"after the event", per Laskin, C.J.C. (Royal Bank, supra, footnote 1, at p. 32). On the
other hand, "[k]nowledge, at least in the sense of awareness of the existence of the payee
and who he was, existed" in the cases setting forth the distinction between "fictitious"
and "non-existing" (ibid., at p. 36).
25 For the former is no more "imaginary" or less "real person" than the latter within the
words of Laskin, C.J.C., in Royal Bank, supra, footnote 1, at p. 29. Cf. also the test cited
in footnote 23, supra.
26 A point that is stressed by Laskin, C.J.C., at p. 38, and emerges from the account of the
facts by Spence, J., at p. 44.
27 Ibid., at pp. 38-43.
28 Cf. footnotes 19-22 and text, supra.
29 Royal Bank, supra, footnote I, at pp. 45-6.
30 Ibid., at p. 46. The point is also mentioned by Laskin, C.J.C., at p. 43. The cheques were
in small amounts and were duly signed by an authorized signing officer of the drawer.
31 Ibid., at p. 46.
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Their opinion did not prevail. The majority preferred the ac-
cepted interpretation of s. 21(5) of the Act and in dealing with the
cheques drawn to the order of named former employees held for
the drawer company.32 In so doing, the majority decision gives rise
to basic questions underlying the construction of the Act in rela-
tion to liability for cheques drawn to the order of a fictitious or
non-existing person. Is liability dependent only on the literal
meaning of "fictitious or non-existent person"? Does it depend on
the construction of the fictitious payee section in light of the rules
of common law concerning the subject? Or rather, does the rule of
the fictitious payee merely constitute one manifestation of a
broader principle of law? If it does, then neither the literal mean-
ing of the term, nor the rules of the common law, should be deci-
sive but instead the policies behind the principle should determine
the issue.
This comment is designed to examine the issue presented in
Royal Bank in light of these questions and thereby demonstrate
that they reflect complementary rather than alternative techniques
in the construction of the Act and the interpretation of its terms. It
will be argued that the meaning of s. 21(5) of the Act in general,
and in its application to the facts of Royal Bank in particular,
though depending on each of these three facets of inquiry should,
primarily, be determined in light of the duty of care of the drawer
of a cheque. 33
II
The canon for construing a codifying statute in general, and the
English Bills of Exchange Act 34 in particular, was given by Lord
Herschell in the leading case of Bank of England v. Vagliano
32 Ibid., at pp. 47-8 per Pigeon, J.
33 The possibility of determining the existence or the scope of such a duty under the Que-
bec Civil Code will not be considered in this comment. It will rather be assumed in the
following discussion that the rules dealing with the duty of care of the drawer of a cheque
constitute part of "the law of bills and notes in the strict sense" (for this expression, see
Falconbridge, supra, footnote 10, at p. 456). This assumption is based on the effect of the
nature of a bill and the process of payment thereof, as well as of the provisions of the
Act, on the existence, content and limits of that duty ofcare in the law of bills and notes
(for this effect see sections III and IV, infra). But see Lepage, "La banque et le faux
endossement", 9 Rev. Jur. Themis 411 (1974), at p. 429, arguing for the applicability of s.
1053 of the Quebec Civil Code to the facts of Royal Bank.
34 Cited at footnote 5, supra. The Act in Canada is "the adoption . . . with some
modification" of the English Act, Falconbridge, supra, footnote 10, at p. 425.
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Brothers:35
... the proper way to deal with such a statute as the Bills of Exchange Act,
which was intended to be a code of the law relating to negotiable instru-
ments. ... is in the first instance to examine the language of the statute and
to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any considerations de-
rived from the previous state of the law. 36
Applying this canon to the fictitious payee section, Lord Hersc-
hell declined to read it as refined by any rule "derived from the
previous state of the law."' 37 To do so would be to confine the ap-
plication of the rule of the fictitious payee only as against a party
with knowledge of the fraud. 38 It seemed to Lord Herschell that
adding this limitation or condition to the language of the fictitious
payee section would be "doing violence to the language of the
statute", and he could find "no warrant in the statute itself for in-
serting any limitation or condition. '39 He therefore turned to the
interpretation of the word "fictitious" in Dr. Johnson's Dictionary
and concluded that:
... where the name inserted as that of the payee is so inserted by way of pre-
tence merely, without any intention that payment shall only be made in con-
formity therewith, the payee is a fictitious person within the meaning of the
statute, whether the name be that of an existing person, or of one who has
no existence. 40
From this last passage of Lord Herschell's opinion it was later
concluded in Vinden v. Hughes41 that whether an existing person
qualifies as a fictitious payee depends solely on the intention of the
drawer. When the drawer is induced by his dishonest clerk to
draw cheques payable to existing customers these customers are
intended by the drawer to be paid, and it cannot therefore be said
that their names are inserted by way of pretence only.42 This hold-
ing underlies the Royal Bank decision. 43
To argue that the addition of "to the knowledge of the drawer"
35 [1891] A.C. 107 (H.L.).
36 Ibid., at p. 144.
37 Ibid.
38 A summary of the pre-Act authorities appears in the decision of the Court of Appeal in
Vagliano where the majority held that the rule survived the passage of the English Act:
Vagliano Brothers v. The Bank of England (1889), 23 Q.B.D. 243 (C.A.), at pp. 255 et seq.,
per Bowen, L.J.
39 Vagliano, supra, footnote 35 at p. 146.
40 Ibid., at p. 153.
41 [190511 K.B. 795.
42 Cf., footnotes 19-22 and text, supra.
43 See footnotes 12-22 and text, supra.
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after "fictitious" in the fictitious payee section is an interpretation
of the word "fictitious", and not the insertion of a limitation or
condition into the language of the section, is hardly plausible.
Ironically, those who purported to follow Lord Herschell, while
faithfully declining to introduce the pre-Act limitation or condi-
tion into the fictitious payee section, understood him to insert a
limitation or condition of his own into its language.
Whether or not this limitation actually reflects the view of Lord
Herschell is beside the present issue. For one thing, the circum-
stances wherein the rule of the fictitious payee operates cannot be
ascertained by reference to the meaning given to the word
"fictitious" in the language. The question of the meaning to be
given the rule of the fictitious payee is one which should be an-
swered in the context of the construction of the Act. As was cor-
rectly noted with respect to Lord Herschell's canon, 44 he "seems to
lay all the emphasis. on interpretation, that is in ascertaining the
meaning of the words used and almost ignores the broader ques-
tion of construction. ' 45 Whether an existing person can be
"fictitious" within the meaning of the section, is a question of stat-
utory interpretation to be answered according to the "natural
meaning" 46 of the word "fictitious" in the language. When or in
what circumstances an existing person can be "fictitious" within
the meaning of a given statutory rule depends on the construction of
the applicable section in the context of the meaning of the statute
as a whole. Lord Herschell's failure to express this distinction has
resulted in giving the decision in Vagliano a meaning which under-
mines the principle upon which it appeared to be based.
In the context of the broader question of the construction of the
Act, attention should have been given to s. 97(2) of the English
Act (s. 10 of the Canadian Act). The section provides that "[tihe
rules of common law,47 including the law merchant, save in so far
as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act,
shall continue to apply to ... cheques". Since no "express provi-
sions of this Act" appear to deal with the scope of the rule of the
fictitious payee, consideration of "[t]he rules of the common law,
including the law merchant" seems to have been warranted.
44 Text and footnote 36, supra.
45 Kulp, "The Fictitious Payee", 18 Mich. L. Rev. 296 (1920), at p. 307.
46 In the sense of Lord Herschell's canon, text and footnote 36, supra.
47 Section 10 of the Act adds here the words "of England". Cf in general, footnote 33,
supra, the extent to which the rules of the common law apply under the Act.
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Yet Lord Herschell's failure to read the pre-Act limitation into
the scope of the rule of the fictitious payee is excusable. "The rules
of common law ... [that] continue to apply"48 are not necessarily
those in their static form as they preceded the Act. Rather, they
may well refer to the dynamic and continuing process of law-mak-
ing in the common law, or more specifically to the potential of a
newly-recognized policy to affect the reading of the language of a
section by providing a different rationale.
Also, the construction of a statute can by no means be per-
formed mechanically. What the "express provisions of this Act" 49
provide depends, to a great extent, on what one is prepared to
read into them. This, in turn, other than being determined by the
meaning of the specific words in the language, is a function of the
policies underlying a given statutory rule, whether as of itself or as
part of the statute as a whole. The "express provisions" of a sec-
tion may mean more than its language appears to say, once it is
read in the light of the underlying policy thereof. When the lan-
guage of a section is too meagre to provide for a comprehensive
guideline to the scope of the rule embodied therein, as it is in the
case with the fictitious payee section, the injection of policy con-
siderations into the "express provisions" is a must.50
The pre-Act rationale of the rule of the fictitious payee was un-
derstood to be estoppel against a party with knowledge of the
fraud.51 This rationale was inapplicable to the facts of Vagliano.
They involved purported bills of exchange on which a clerk of the
acceptor forged the drawer's signature, obtained the acceptor's
signature by fraud, and then, by forging also the payee's signature,
obtained payment at the acceptor's bank. "In the House of Lords
the negligence of each party was strongly relied on . . . [the
acceptor-customer] not discovering that bills to a huge amount,
which represented no commercial transactions, were being drawn
on him, and the bank having paid these sums across the counter to
a stranger". 52 Thus, by extending the rule of the fictitious payee
48 Under s. 97(2) of the English Act.
49 Ibid.
50 Cf Kulp, supra, footnote 45, at pp. 307-13. Note that in drafting s. 7(3) of the English
Act, the draftsmen were probably not sure of what they were doing: Chalmers Vagliano,
supra, footnote 23, at p. 218.
51 See summary of Bowen, L.J., in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Vagliano, cited in
footnote 38, supra.
52 Byles, supra, footnote 19, at p. 24, n. 97. Vagliano stands also for the proposition that the
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also to the case of a negligent party 53 without knowledge of the
fraud, the Vagliano majority rejected the pre-Act estoppel ration-
ale of the rule, and displaced it with the broader principle of negli-
gence. Negligence of the customer was either read into the lan-
guage of the fictitious payee section, or superimposed on it as one
of "[tihe rules of common law ... [that] continue to apply".54
Subsequent cases failed to read Vagliano in this light but instead
focused on the linguistic argument of Lord Herschell. New fact
situations were put into the straitjacket of Lord Herschell's lan-
guage rather than measured in the light of a guiding principle.
This construction technique has led to the holding in Royal Bank.
III
The authority of a drawee bank to debit the account of the
drawer for the full amount of a cheque that was so negligently
drawn as to permit its subsequent alteration by the insertion of
words and figures without erasures was established in England in
the leading case of Young v. Grote.55 For a period, the real
meaning,56 and even the authority, 57 of the case were doubted, un-
til fully re-established by the House of Lords in London Joint
Stock Bank v. MacMillan58 where it was said that the "sole ground
upon which Young v. Grote was decided ... was that Young was a
customer of the bank owing to the bank the duty of drawing his che-
negligence of the defaulting party charges him with the loss, notwithstanding the inter-
vention of crime: Beven, " Young v. Grote", 23 L.Q.R. 390 (1907). at p. 397. "The criterion
is whether there is a duty to do something, neglect of which starts a train of consequences
to which one is crime". Ibid.
53 Four of the Law Lords (Halsbury, L.C., Earl of Selborne and Lords Watson and Mac-
naghten) referred specifically to the conduct of the parties. Most explicit in pointing at
negligence of the customer as the rationale for his decision was Earl of Selborne. Though
"unusual", the conduct of the bank was found by him irrelevant in determining liability.
Vagliano, supra, footnote 35, at pp. 127-8.
54 Under s. 97(2) of the English Act.
55 (1827), 4 Bing 253, 130 E.R. 764.
56 It had been questioned whether the case stood for apparent authority, duty of care in
favour of all takers of a negotiable instrument, or a contractual duty to take care owed
by a depositor to his bank with respect to cheques: Note, "Careless Spaces in Negotiable
Instruments", 31 Harv. L. Rev. 779(1918).
57 Young was treated by the Privy Council as no longer law, in Colonial Baik ofAusiralasia
v. Marshall, [1906] A.C. 559. This view was convincingly challenged by Beven, supra,
footnote 52, passim.
58 [1918] A.C. 777. The case was followed in Canada in Will v. Bank of Montreal, [1931] 3
D.L.R. 526, [193112 W.W.R. 364 (Alta. S.C.).
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que with reasonable care".59
Whether the improper office management which enables a dis-
honest clerk to procure cheques and to forge the endorsements
thereon, constitutes a breach of the duty of care of the customer to
the drawee bank has never been an issue in England. This is be-
cause s. 60 of the English Act creates an important exception to
the rule that a forged signature is "wholly inoperative". 60 The sec-
tion protects a drawee bank that pays a cheque with a forged
endorsement6' in good faith and in the ordinary course of business
by providing in effect that it is entitled to debit the drawer's
account.62
Being broader in its operation than negligence, the effect of the
section is that the existence of a duty of care on the part of the
customer is irrelevant in dealing with the authority of the drawee
bank to debit the drawer's account with value of cheques paid on
forged endorsements. 63 As it is general in its application to all
59 [1918] A.C. 777. (H.L.), at p. 793 per Lord Finlay, L.C., emphasis added. It has been still
questioned whether the negligence of the customer entitles the bank to sue him under the
tort of negligence, or whether it merely triggers estoppel by negligence against the cus-
tomer when he sues the bank: see e.g., O'Hare, Comment, I Australian Bus. Law Rev.
335 (1972), at p. 336. Note however that estoppel by negligence presupposes the existence
of a duty of care: Swan v. North British Australasian Co. (1863), 2 H. & C. 175 at p. 182,
159 E.R. 73 (Ex.Ct.), per Blackburn, J. See in general; Pickering, "Estoppel by Conduct",
55 L.Q. Rev. 400 (1939), at pp. 4 11-16; Kadirgamar, "The Problem Promissory Note: A
Question of Estoppel", 22 Mod. L. Rev. 146 (1959); M. A. Millner, Negligence in Modern
Law (1967), pp. 142-8.
60 This is the rule under s. 24 of the English Act; s. 49(l) of the Act in Canada. See foot-
notes 5-6 and text, supra.
61 It has been questioned whether or not the provision covers the case of the forger signing
the name of the payee on the back of the cheque at the time of receiving payment from
the payor, see Byles, supra, footnote 19, at p. 254, nn. 17-19 and text.
62 Section 60 of the English Act reads as follows:
When a bill payable to order on demand is drawn on a banker, and the banker
on whom it is drawn pays the bill in good faith and in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, it is not incumbent on the banker to show that the indorsement of the payee or
any subsequent indorsement was made by or under the authority of the person
whose indorsement it purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have paid the bill
in due course, although such indorsement has been forged or made without authori-
ty.
Whenever a bank pays a bill in due course under the terms of this provision, it is entitled
to debit the drawer's account: Charles v. Blackwell (1876), I C.P.D. 548. affd 2 C.P.D.
151 (C.A.).
63 The bank will prevail under s. 60 of the English Act regardless of negligence on the part
of either itself or the customer, provided payment was made "in good faith and in the or-
dinary course of business". Byles, supra, footnote 19, at pp. 253-4. A concise history of s.
60 (together with a rationale thereto) appears in Kessler, "Forged Endorsements", 47
Yale L. J. 863 (1938), at pp. 868-71.
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cases of forged endorsements, the effect of s. 60 of the English Act
is also to exclude the drawee bank and customer relation from the
coverage of the fictitious payee section.64 The cumulative effect is
then to exclude the rule of the fictitious payee from falling within
the ambit of the duty of care of a customer to the drawee bank.
The reason Vagliano was not covered by s. 60 of the English Act
was that the bank there, though dealing with his customer, was
not the drawee. 65 The operation of the fictitious payee section, as
well as the duty of care of a customer to his banker, could thus be
considered in the case. Yet, Vagliano involved an unusual fact sit-
uation, never to recur in a reported case. Consequently, its mes-
sage of construing the fictitious payee section on the basis of the
duty of care of the customer to his banker went unnoticed in the
case law to come.66
In Canada, a drawee bank does not enjoy the protection em-
bodied in s. 60 of the English Act67 and upon paying a cheque on
a forged endorsement is bound under s. 49(1) of the Canadian Act
to re-credit the account of the drawer.68 The fictitious payee sec-
tion provides an exception to that general rule.69 Whether liability
of the drawee bank under the general rule of s. 49(1) of the Act is
subject to a duty of care of the customer, and whether the ficti-
tious payee section is a codification of one aspect of the duty of
care of the customer to the drawee bank, are questions that cannot
be answered by reference to specific rules of the English law where
s. 60 makes them superfluous. At the same time, a fresh look at
Vagliano seems to have been warranted.70
64 The leading English cases construing the fictitious payee section, with the notable excep-
tion of Vagliano (see the following footnote and text), involved contests between the
drawer and purchasers of the instrument: Royal Bank, supra, footnote I at p. 3 1, per Las-
kin, C.J.C.
65 The bills were payable at the acceptor's bank, rather than drawn on the bank; cf footnote
52, supra.
66 Cf last paragraph of section 1I, at p. 426, supra.
67 Falconbridge, supra, footnote 10, at p. 566.
68 See footnotes 4-8 and text, supra.
69 See footnotes 9-10 and text, supra.
70 Indeed, Vagliano was originally understood in Canada also to apply to a fact situation
where the drawer had been induced by a dishonest clerk to draw cheques to an actual
customer to whom no debt had been owed: London Life Assurance Co. v. Molsons Bank
(1904), 8 O.L.R. 238 (C.A.). Where "[t]he distinction between such a case and one where
the payees were never intended by the drawer to receive the money was not overlooked,
but ... t] here being no corresponding provision in the Canadian Bills of Exchange Act to s.
60 of the ... [English Act], the bank would have been otherwise without a defence as against
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It is noteworthy that in the American jurisdictions, the statute
which in the past governed bills and notes, the Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Law (hereafter N.I.L.),71 did not contain a parallel pro-
vision to s. 60 of the English Act. 72 Wherever the failure of a cus-
tomer to use reasonable care enabled the committing of a forged
endorsement, courts were faced with the task of deciding a
customer's duty of care to his banker.7 3 However, the fictitious
payee section of the N.I.L., s. 9(3), provided in its original form
that an "instrument is payable to bearer when it is payable to the
order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was
known to the person making it so payable".74 As such, its construc-
tion did not require the application of principles of negligence.
Unless the drawer or the signing officer thereof75 knew personally
of the fraud the section was inapplicable.
Against this background, a "bankers' amendment" to s. 9(3) of
the N.I.L. was introduced. The amendment was designed to en-
large the scope of the original section to the case where a dishon-
est employee or agent supplied the name of the fictitious payee. 76
Also being specific in its applicability, the construction of the
amended version did not require the rationalization of negligence.
As a result, the American experience with construing s. 9(3) of the
N.I.L. cannot be employed in the search for a guideline to the
construction of the fictitious payee section in the Canadian Act.
... their customers" and therefore it prevailed: Byles, supra, footnote 19 at p. 26 n. 9 rely-
ing on Falconbridge, emphasis added. Cf Falconbridge, "The Law of Bills and Notes:
Fictitious or Non-Existing Payee", 43 Can. Law J. 225 (1907). For the later develop-
ments in Canada up to Royal Bank, see Royal Bank, supra, footnote 1, at pp. 34 et seq.,
per Laskin, C.J.C. Cf also footnote 22, supra the line of authority overruling Molsons
Bank in Canada.
71 The statute was promulgated in 1896 and was the first major project of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Up to 1924, when it was last en-
acted, it was adopted by 48 states: Braucher, "The Legislative History of the Uniform
Commercial Code", 58 Col. L. Rev. 798 (1958), at p. 799 .
72 See in general, Kessler, supra, footnote 63, at pp. 878-9.
73 Comment, "Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of Negotiable In-
struments and the Uniform Commercial Code", 62 Mich. L. Rev. 417 (1953), at pp. 425-
31; cf Arant, "Forged Checks- The Duty of the Depositor to His Bank", 31 Yale L.J.
598 (1922) passint
74 Section 9(3) of the N.I.L., emphasis added. See in general, W. E. Britton, Handbook on
the Law of Bills and Notes (1961), pp. 427-440.
75 Mueller & Martin v. Liberty Ins. Bank, 218 S.W. 465 (Ky. 1920).
76 The amendment added to s. 9(3) (footnote 74 and text, supra) the following phrase: "or
known to his employee or other agent who supplies the name of such payee"; see in gen-
eral, Broadman, "Proper Construction of the So-Called 'Bankers' Amendment' to See-
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The same is also true with respect to the present American
Uniform Commercial Code77 In dealing with the rule of the ficti-
tious payee in s. 3-405,8 it explicitly covers the padded payroll
cases as a separate category. 9 Since the Canadian Act contains no
corresponding provisions, the Royal Bank majority rejected "the
argument of ... [the bank], based on references to legislation in
other countries." 80
However, in so doing, the Royal Bank majority overlooked the
place of s. 3-405 in the scheme of allocation of forgery losses un-
der the U.C.C. Like the Canadian Act, the U.C.C. does not have a
counterpart to s. 60 of the English Act and, under the Code provi-
sions, the duty of care of a customer may affect his liability for
cheques paid on forged endorsements. Likewise, under the
U.C.C., as is true under the Canadian Act, the fictitious payee sec-
tion applies to the customer-drawer bank relationship.8 In this
framework, U.C.C., s. 3-405 is explained by negligence, and apart
from its specific provisions, it is viewed as a codification of "the
proposition that certain behavior is negligent and thus renders sig-
natures resulting from that behavior effective against the negligent
party."82 It is the adoption of that broad principle that should
tion 9(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Its Significance Respecting Forgery
Claims under Bankers' Blanket Bonds", 17 Ins. Coun. J. 166 (1950).
77 The U.C.C. deals with negotiable instruments in Article 3 (Commercial Paper) and Arti-
cle 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections). These Articles are in force in all 50 states. Cur-
rently there are two official texts of the U.C.C.: from 1962 and from 1972. The 1972
Official Text did not introduce any change in Articles 3 and 4.
78 The Official Comment to the section specifies the uniqueness of its legislative technique
as follows: "The words 'fictitious or nonexisting person' have been eliminated [from the
section] since the existence or nonexistence of the named payee is not decisive and is im-
portant only as it may bear on the intent that ... [the payee] shall have no interest. The
instrument is not made payable to bearer and endorsements [by any person in the name
of the named payee] are still necessary to negotiation". In general with respect to s. 3-405
of the U.C.C., see Comment, "The Fictitious Payee and the UCC - The Demise of A
Ghost", 18 U. Chic. L. Rev. 281 (1951).
79 Section 3-405 (1)(c) reads as follows:
(I) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee is effective if...
(c) an agent or employee of the maker or drawer has supplied him with the name of
the payee intending the latter to have no such interest.
80 Royal Bank, supra, footnote I, at p. 48, per Pigeon, J.
81 Cf footnotes 60-70 and text supra.
82 J. White and R. Summers, Handbook of the Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code
(1972), p. 542. In dealing with the underlying policy of s. 3-405(c) (footnote 79, supra),
Official Comment (4) states also that "the loss should fall upon the employer as a risk of
his business" and that the employer is "in a better position to cover the loss by fidelity
insurance"; cf also Royal Bank, supra, footnote 1, at p. 32. per Laskin, C.J.C. Neverthe-
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have been considered by the court in Royal Bank. Being war-
ranted under Vagliano8 3 and formulated under a statute whose
scheme of allocation of forgery losses is analogous to the one un-
der the Act in Canada,8 4 this broad principle of negligence pro-
vides a clear rationale to the fictitious payee section, free from the
traps of the linguistic argument of Lord Herschell.
However, unlike the U.C.C. which, explicitly provides in s. 3-
406 that a person "who by his negligence substantially contributes
to ... the making of an unauthorized signature is precluded from
asserting the ... lack of authority",85 the scope of the duty of care
under Young 86 has been understood in English law to be confined
only to acts or omissions in regard to the drawing and signing of
cheques. As between banker and customer, the customer is under
no duty to exercise reasonable care in the general course of carry-
ing on business.87
Admittedly, a customer's duty of care in preventing forged
endorsements87 a hardly fits into this framework. Nevertheless, it
should always be kept in mind that the existence of s. 60 of the
English Act has resulted in the absence of any thorough discus-
sion with respect to the effect of negligence on liability for pay-
ment of cheques on forged endorsements. Therefore, the limits of
the duty of care of the customer as understood under the English
Act do not necessarily apply to the construction of the Canadian
Act. Furthermore, Vagliano, as already indicated, 88 is an exception
less, since banks are no less good risk bearers, what shifts the loss resulting from acts of
dishonest clerks to the employer (s. 3-405( l)(c) of the U.C.C.). is his ability to prevent the
loss by exercising due care.
83 Footnotes 52-4 and text, supra.
84 In general for the allocation of forgery losses in American law, see Comment,
"Allocation of Losses". supra. footnote 73.passim.
85 The theory of the section is estoppel by negligence rather than the tort of negligence,
Official Comment (5) to s. 3-406 of the U.C.C.: cf. footnote 59, supra. The applicability
of the section to negligence contributing to a forgery of the signature of another is explic-
itly referred to in Official Comment (7).
86 Footnotes 55-59 and text, supra.
87 Chalmers, supra, footnote 21, at p. 206: Falconbridge, supra, footnote 10, at pp. 564-565.
This view was recently affirmed in National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. v. Walpole and
Patterson Ltd., [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 7. at pp. 17 etseq.
878 Negligence in the padded payroll cases refers to choosing and supervising employees in
sensitive positions (White and Summers, supra, footnote 82, at p. 542), as well as to the
failure to set proper procedure of verification before mailing the cheques, and after they
are returned by the bank together with a statement of account: cf foonote 31 and text,
supra.
88 Footnotes 52-54 and text, supra.
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to the narrow understanding of the duty of care in English law
and can justify the extension thereof to situations (and jurisdic-
tions) where s. 60 of the English Act is inapplicable.
Unfortunately, the opportunity to deal with the rule of the ficti-
tious payee in the broad context of the duty of care of the cus-
tomer was missed in Royal Bank.89 Such analysis is warranted
under Vagliano, seems justified under the Act in light of the ab-
sence of a counterpart to s. 60 of the English Act, and could have
led to a better quality of justice.
IV
The duty of care of a drawer in issuing cheques has traditionally
been regarded in English law as owed only to his banker. While it
was originally questioned whether Young could be authority for
the broader proposition "that the person putting in circulation a
bill of exchange does, by the law merchant, owe a duty to allpar-
ties to the bill to take reasonable precautions", 90 the view prevailed
that the basis for liability in Young was the contract between the
customer and the banker, and the duty had therefore been confi-
ned to that relation.91 The drawer of a bill or the maker of a note
owes no duty to the public at large, "[i]f a person is careless of his
property,92 and it is stolen in consequence, and the thief sells it to
an innocent purchaser, the true owner can recover it from the in-
nocent purchaser, notwithstanding his negligence ... [T]here is no
legal duty to the public on the part of the owner to keep his own prop-
erty safe from theft". 93
The vindication of negligence as the underlying policy of the
fictitious payee section can hardly be reconciled with this restric-
tive view of the drawer's duty of care. The effect of the section as
89 But cf footnote 31 and text, supra.
90 Swan v. North British Australasian Co. (1862), 2 H. & C. 175 at p. 183, 159 E.R. 73 (Ex.
Ct.),per Blackburn, J., emphasis added.
91 Landmark cases are Baxendale v. Bennett (1878), 3 Q.B.D. 525 (C.A.); Societe Gndrale v.
Metropolitan Bank (1873), 21 W.R. 335, 27 L.T. 849. See in general Chalmers, supra, foot-
note 21, at p. 206, n. 60; Beven, supra, footnote 52,passim.
92 But see Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 184 N.E.
2d 358 (Mass. 1962): a cheque in the hands of a drawer, prior to the delivery thereof to
the payee, is not "valuable property" in his hands. The case is not convincing.
93 Brown v. Bennett; Colonial Bank of New Zealand v. Bennett (1891), 9 N.Z. L.R. 487 (C.A.),
at p. 507; emphasis added. Cf. Britton, "Negligence in the Law of Bills and Notes", 24
Col. L. Rev. 695 (1924), at pp. 706-7: distinguishing between questions of liability in neg-
ligence and questions of legal title.
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it is worded, 94 as well as its application in the cases,95 is clearly to
make the drawer also liable to a subsequent purchaser of the bill.
Thus, while the doctrine of Young could provide a just solution in
Royal Bank irrespective of the fictitious payee section, 96 the sec-
tion itself appears to require the existence of a broader rationale
than the present understanding of Young.
Indeed, many American courts tended to prefer a broader inter-
pretation of Young and extended it to cases arising between par-
ties other than the drawer and drawee. 97 Their view was adopted
by the draftsmen of the U.C.C. who noted that "[b]y drawing the
instrument and 'setting it afloat upon a sea of strangers' the maker
or drawer voluntarily enters into a relation with later holders
which justifies his responsibility". 98 Accordingly, it was provided
in s. 3-406 of the U.C.C. that the substantial contribution to the
making of an unauthorized signature by way of negligence99 re-
sults in the preclusion from "asserting the ... lack of authority
against a holder in due course'°° or against a drawee or other payor
who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's
business." This section was construed to apply to the claim of a
collecting bank' 0 against a drawer of a cheque, who, by sending it
negligently to the wrong person substantially contributed to the
making of a forged endorsement thereon. 0 2 Its underlying princi-
94 Footnotes 9-10 and text, supra.
95 Cited by Laskin, C.J.C., Royal Bank, supra, footnote i, at p. 31.
96 Cf ibid., at p. 39, where Laskin, C.J.C., stated that he could not "read s. 49(1) otherwise
than as obliging the bank which pays on a forged endorsement to establish on a balance
of probabilities some valid ground for avoiding the liability that would otherwise rest on
it".
97 See in general, Note, "Careless Spaces", supra, footnote 56, at p. 781 and n. 13. But under
one view this is a "misunderstanding" of Young, Note, 4 Cor. L.Q. 46 (1919), at p. 47,
and n. 7. Cf. also Britton, supra, footnote 74, at p. 668, where the author finds it difficult
"to justify the broader rule which assumes a duty ... to subsequent holders".
98 Section 3-406 of the U.C.C., Official Comment (2).
99 See footnote 85 and text, supra.
100 Emphasis added. Note that a purchaser of a cheque bearing a forged endorsement is not
a holder, and therefore he is not a holder in due course; but cf. footnote 101, infra.
101 In applying the section to a collecting bank that could not be a holder (supra, footnote
100), the court either extended the principle of the section, or presupposed the genuine-
ness of the endorsement by virtue of the preclusion from asserting "the ... lack of
authority".
102 Park State Bank v. Arena Auto Auction, Inc., 207 N.E. 2d 158 (111. 1965). See also
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. National Bank and Trust Co. of Central Pennsylvania,
364 A. 2d 1331 (Pa. 1976), negligence of a drawer in safekeeping of cheques already
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pie would also provide an explanation to another case which
found that the negligence of a payee who contributed to the forg-
ing of his own endorsement precluded him, under s. 3-404, from
denying to the collecting bank the effect of the endorsement.10 3
This section provides in subsec. (1) that "[a]ny unauthorized sig-
nature is wholly inoperative as that of the person whose name is
signed unless he ... is precluded from denying it". 04
Though s. 3-406 of the U.C.C. does not have a counterpart in
the Act, and although its Official Comment (2) explicitly speaks of
the extension of the doctrine of Young "to the protection of a
holder in due course and of payors who may not technically be
drawees", the introduction of the principle embodied in the sec-
tion does not require the intervention of the Legislature. The law-
making process of defining new relationships that give rise to a
duty of care is a continuing one and those relationships that have
already been defined by decided cases are not exhaustive. 0 5 It is
also well established that a negligent performance by A of his con-
tract with B may give an independent cause of action to C who
"derives his rights [against A] not from the contract but from the
circumstances that the nature of A's contractual duties to B ought
reasonably to put him in mind that third persons, such as C, might
be in jeopardy should A be negligent in the performance of his
contract with B".106 Thus, the contractual roots of the duty under
Young should not constitute a bar to its extension by courts to-
ward third parties.
In addition, U.C.C., s. 3-404(1)107 has a parallel in the Act. Sec-
tion 49(1), after providing that a forged signature "is wholly
inoperative", explicitly exempts from the coverage of that general
rule circumstances where "the party against whom it is sought to
retain or enforce payment of the bill is precluded from setting up
the forgery or want of authority". 0 8 The American case which
construed U.C.C., s. 3-404(1) to mean that negligence precluded a
drawer from denying to the collecting bank the effect of a forged
signed by him precluded him from asserting the forged endorsement thereon against a
collecting bank.
103 Cooper v. Union Bank, 507 P. 2d 612 (Cal. 1973).
104 Section 3-404(l) of the U.C.C.
105 See in general, Charlesworth On Negligence. 5th ed., Percy ed, ( 1971), pp. 13 et seq.
106 Millner, supra, footnote 59, at p. 129.
107 Footnote 104 and text, supra.
108 Cf footnotes 5-8 and text, supra.
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endorsement, 09 relied explicitly on the Official Comment to the
section,"10 and implicitly on s. 3-406's general principle. Neverthe-
less, that court's interpretation of the s. 3-404 preclusion clause
could be adopted by Canadian courts as a means to superimpose
negligence principles on s. 49(1) of the Act."'
It may well be that the "assault upon the citadel" of the con-
tract as the basis to the contours of the doctrine of Young has al-
ready started in England. Thus, in Saunders v. Anglia Building
Society,"2 a party who had not exercised reasonable care in
signing a document was not allowed to set a plea of non estfactum
against a bona fide third party who had relied on the signature.
Though the House of Lords explicitly rejected the existence of a
duty of care on the part of the signer," 3 it is hard to find a better
rationale for the decision. 14 The proposition that "this is ... an il-
lustration of the principle that no man can take advantage of his
own wrong"" 5 is too vague" 6 and is therefore far from being con-
vincing.
V
Being concerned only with the relationship between the drawer
and the drawee, the fact situation in Royal Bank did not raise the
problem of extending the duty under Young towards the purchaser
of an instrument. Likewise, not involving negligent conduct of the
bank," '7 the case did not raise the further question of the effect of
109 Footnote 103, supra.
110 Official Comment (4) explicitly recognizes "the negligence which precludes a denial of
the signature", emphasis added.
III Negligence of the customer (though not in the context of forged endorsement) is dis-
cussed by Falconbridge as affecting liability under s. 49(l) of the Act: Falconbridge,
supra, footnote 10, at pp. 555, 562.
112 [1970] 3 All E.R. 961 (H.L.).
113 Ibid., at p. 966 per Lord Hodson, at p. 982 per Lord Pearson.
114 Cf Anson, "Carlisle and Cumberland Banking Co. v. Bragg", 28 L.Q.R. 190 (1912),
where the author would prefer to discuss an analogous situation under estoppel by neg-
ligence rather than under the tort of negligence: ibid., at p. 194. None the less, the exist-
ence of a duty of care is essential in asserting estoppel by negligence: see footnote 59,
supra.
115 [197013 All E.R. 961 (H.L.), at p. 966.per Lord Hodson.
116 In this context compare the simplistic proposition that "wherever one of two innocent
persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occa-
sion the loss must sustain it": Lickbarrow v. Mason (1787), 2 T.R. 63, at p. 70, per
Ashhurst, J. This maxim cannot be taken at face value: Kadirgamar, supra, footnote 59,
at p. 146.
117 See footnote 30 and text, supra.
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contributory negligence on the liability of the drawer. Unfettered
by such complications, the case could have been used as an oppor-
tunity for presenting the basic proposition of superimposing negli-
gence concepts on the scheme of s. 49(1) of the Act, and its appli-
cation to the reading of s. 21(5) thereof.
Though the enactment of statutory provisions modelled on s. 3-
405(l)(c) of the U.C.C. 118 will solve the particular issue of Royal
Bank, reliance on the intervention of the Legislature suffers from
limitations. In construing detailed statutory provisions, courts
tend to focus on the scope of the letter of the statute, thereby los-
ing sight of the guiding principle that also may apply to border
cases that fall outside the provisions themselves.' 19 No matter how
far the Legislature goes in providing specific fact situations that
fall within the fictitious payee rule, the existence of a guiding prin-
ciple to be applied beyond those statutory provisions should be
clearly pronounced. The interpretation of the term "fictitious",
and the examination of the common law rules are steps in the
right direction; yet without an underlying principle they will lead
to inconsistency and injustice.
The pronoucement of such a guiding principle should not await
the intervention of the Legislature. By the 18th century, at a time
when there was no s. 3-406 or a Bills of Exchange Act, Lord Mans-
field stated that the loss caused by forgery should fall "on him
who is most in fault". 20 In working its way out of the statutory
maze of the Bills of Exchange Act, the Royal Bank majority lost
sight of this simple truth.
Benjamin Geva*
118 Footnote 79, supra.
119 Cf Snug Harbour Realty Co. v. First National Bank of Toms River, 253 A. 2d 581 (N.J.
1969), a situation on the borderline of s. 3-405(1)(c) of the U.C.C.
120 Aaron Smith and another, assignees of Bagnall and Hand v. Shepperd(1775), cited in Chit-
ty, Bills of Exchange, 1st ed. (1799), p. 126, n. 4.
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